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Abstract
In this paper, we study score procurement auctions with all-pay quality bids. A suppliers score
is the di¤erence between his quality and price bids. The supplier with the highest score wins and
gets paid his own price bid. The procurers payo¤ is the di¤erence between the winners quality and
the procurers payments to the suppliers. Equilibrium quality and price bids are solved without rst
obtaining the corresponding equilibrium scores. We nd that quality bids, the supplierspayo¤s and the
procurers payo¤ do not depend on whether price bids are made contingent on quality bids. Compared
to a benchmark of winner-pay quality bids, in which the losing suppliers quality bidding costs are
reimbursed by the procurer, all-pay quality bids tend to reduce quality provision and supplierspayo¤s,
but they tend to increase the total surplus and the procurers payo¤.
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1 Introduction
Procurement is widely adopted to acquire goods, services, or work. On average, about 15% of yearly global
domestic product is spent on public procurement alone, including military acquisitions.1 Procurements
involving multi-dimensional bids are ubiquitous. Typically, suppliers are required to bid on both quality and
price, which jointly form single-dimensional scores that are used by the procurer to determine the winner,
whose o¤er turns out to be the most economically advantageous.
Since the seminal work of Che [7], score auctions with winner-pay quality bids have been studied in the
literature in many contexts, including Branco [6], Asker and Cantillon [1, 2], Bajari, Houghton and Tadelis
[3], Wang and Liu [14], Hanazono, Nakabayashi and Tsuruoka [9] and Nishimura [12]. In this literature,
the central idea in identifying equilibrium bidding strategies is to transform the multi-dimensional bidding
problem into a single-dimensional problem of bidding on score. This idea is based on the insightful observation
that a supplier should choose quality and price bids optimally to maximize his payo¤ conditional on winning
with any score s. The optimal quality and price choice for any score s would allow the denition of a value
function for each supplier, which only depends on own type and the score bid s. With this value function,
the original problem with multi-dimensional bids is transformed into a standard single-dimensional problem
with a score bid.2
In many situations, the quality bids are more realistically interpreted as an all-pay component (at least
partially) rather than a winner-pay component.3 For example, all-pay quality bids are often features of pro-
curements in defense contracting and other military design competitions, architectural designs, government
construction projects with a design component, and business to business customized sales. To the best of our
knowledge, Che and Gale [8] are the rst to study score procurement with all-pay quality bids in a complete
information environment. Their focus is to demonstrate the optimality of shortlisting and handicapping in
such environments.
Our study is the rst to introduce all-pay quality bids in score procurement auctions with incomplete
information. We provide an alternative procedure to identify the unique symmetric pure strategy equilibrium
with scores monotonic in types, if such an equilibrium exists. The procedure applies to both cases of all-pay
and winner-pay quality bids.4 The merit of our alternative procedure lies in that we directly identify the
quality bid and price bid without relying on an intermediate step of solving for the score bid. This procedure
is made possible because of another observation on the relationship between equilibrium price and quality
bids in score auctions, which has not been utilized so far in the literature: We can view the pair of equilibrium
1See Supplement to the 2013 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement: Procurement and Innovation,
https://www.unsystem.org/content/supplement-2013-annual-statistical-report-united-nations-procurement (accessed Jan. 15,
2019).
2For a recent general treatment of winner-pay quality-bid score auctions, please refer to Hanazono, Nakabayashi and Tsuruoka
[9] for details.
3See Baye, Kovenock and de Vries [4] and Kaplan, Luski, Sela and Wettstein [10] among many others.
4Our procedure also applies to intermediate cases in Siegel [13].
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quality and price bids as an incentive compatible direct mechanism, with the quality bid being the allocation
rule and the price bid the payment rule. Then, as well understood from Myerson [11], the price bidding
function can be fully pinned down as a function of the quality bidding function. This observation together
with the well utilized insight that a supplier chooses quality and price bids optimally to maximize his payo¤
conditional on bidding the equilibrium score, would allow us to obtain a condition on the equilibrium quality
bidding function which, together with the appropriate boundary condition, identies that function. It thus
follows that we can further identify the equilibrium price bidding function based on the above mentioned
relationship.
The equilibrium analysis enables us to study the e¤ect of all-pay quality bids in score procurement auc-
tions on quality provision, supplier payo¤s, procurer payo¤s and total surplus by comparing our environment
to two benchmarks with winner-pay quality bids. In Benchmark I, we have a hypothetical scenario in which
placing a quality bid does not incur sunk cost. In Benchmark II, we assume the losing supplierssunk costs
incurred in placing their quality bids are reimbursed by the procurer. Our setting thus resembles those of
Baye, Kovenock and de Vries [5] and Siegel [13] who study equilibria in auctions with contingent investment.5
Specically, we adopt a two-supplier environment, in which a suppliers score is the di¤erence between
his quality and price bids. The supplier with the higher score wins and gets paid his own price bid. The
procurers payo¤ equals the di¤erence between the winners quality and her payments to the suppliers. We
nd that compared to the benchmark II environment of winner-pay quality bids, in which the losing suppliers
cost of quality bid is reimbursed by the procurer, all-pay quality bids tend to reduce quality provision and
the supplierspayo¤s, but they tend to increase the total surplus and procurers payo¤. Compared to the
hypothetical benchmark I, in which placing a quality bid does not incur sunk cost, all pay quality bids tend
to reduce quality provision, the supplierspayo¤s and total surplus, although they can either increase or
decrease the procurers payo¤. Consequently, although it is reasonable to view the credible assurance of a
given quality level in many procurement contexts as requiring an upfront sunk investment that is all-pay in
nature, our approach suggests an additional reason for adopting all-pay quality bids in score procurement
auctions: the practice may increase the procurers payo¤.
Moreover, we nd that quality bids, supplier payo¤s and the procurers payo¤ do not depend on whether
quality bids are placed and publicly revealed before the price bids are made. Our result shows that when
quality and price must be placed in sequence, whether or not information on quality bids is revealed does
not a¤ect procurement performance.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model with all-pay quality bids. Section 3
provides a procedure for equilibrium analysis, which applies to both all-pay and winner-pay quality bids, as
well as to a continuum of intermediate cases. Section 4 examines an environment in which quality bids are
5Baye, Kovenock and de Vries [5] study auctions with incomplete information, and Siegel [13] studies settings with complete
information.
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placed and publicly revealed before price bids are made. Section 5 compares all-pay and winner-pay quality
bids on quality provision, supplier payo¤s, the procurers payo¤ and total surplus. Section 6 provides some
concluding remarks. Technical proofs are relegated to the appendices.
2 Model
We consider a score procurement auction with a risk neutral procurer and two risk neutral suppliers. The two
suppliers, i = 1; 2, simultaneously choose their nonnegative bids of quality qi and price pi to compete for a
contract. Only the winner will collect his price bid p, while the quality bid q is an all pay component paid by
each bidder. Bidder i must incur a total cost of Ci(q) = ci&(q) to bid a quality q whether he wins the contract
or not. Here, we assume the function &() is continuous on [0;+1), with &(0) = & 0(0) = 0; & 0(q) > 0;8q > 0;
and & 00(q) > 0;8q  0.6 For example, the class of functions &(q) = q ;  > 1 satises these conditions.
ci is supplier is private type, with high ci leading to high marginal e¤ort cost. We assume that the ci
are independently and identically distributed following cumulative distribution F () on [c; c] with a positive
density f(). We assume 0 < c < c < +1:
The higher score wins and the score function is dened as
s(q; p) = q   p: (1)
The procurers payo¤ is the di¤erence between the q and p of the winning bidder. Supplier is payo¤ is
pi   Ci(qi) if he wins, otherwise it is  Ci(qi).
3 Equilibrium analysis
We now derive the unique equilibrium within the class of symmetric pure strategy equilibria with scores
decreasing in type. There are two key observations that facilitate identifying the equilibrium. Suppose
the score of type ci is s(ci) in the equilibrium. First, if we view the equilibrium strategy (q(ci); p(ci)) as
an incentive compatible direct mechanism, then the Myerson [11] approach, together with a zero payo¤
condition for type c, would allow us to pin down a payment rule p(ci; q()) for any given allocation rule q()
decreasing in type. Second, dene the score by s(ci) = q(ci)  p(ci; q());8ci. Note s() is solely determined
by the allocation rule q(). Given supplier i with type ci bids this score s(ci) in equilibrium, supplier i would
choose a pair (q; p) = (q(ci); p(ci)) when maximizing his expected payo¤. This further gives us conditions
on the equilibrium bidding functions (q(); p()). The restrictions on (q(); p()), which are implied by the
above two observations, together with the boundary condition q(c) = 0, pins down a candidate equilibrium
allocation rule q(). If this q() is decreasing in type, and the corresponding s() is also decreasing in type, then
6 &0(0) and &00(0) refer to the right hand derivatives at zero.
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the identied (q(); p()) is the symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. Otherwise, there exists no equilibrium
within the class.
We will demonstrate that the above two observations allow us to derive the unique symmetric pure
strategy equilibrium with scores decreasing in type,7 when such an equilibrium exists, and to determine
when no such equilibrium exists. To accommodate both cases of an all-pay quality bid and a winner-pay
quality bid, following Baye, Kovenock and de Vries [5] and Siegel [13], we introduce a parameter  2 f0; 1g
in the following analysis, where  represents the fraction of the quality bid that is all-pay.8 Hence,  = 1
stands for an all-pay quality bid, which is the main focus of this paper; and  = 0 stands for the hypothetical
benchmark scenario of a winner-pay quality bid, in which a losing supplier does not incur a cost to place his
quality bid (Benchmark I). The other benchmark scenario of winner-pay quality bid we are going to study
is the case, in which we have  = 1 but the losing suppliers cost of placing his quality bid is reimbursed by the
procurer (Benchmark II). Note that the supplierspayo¤ functions are identical in these two benchmark
environments, thus their equilibrium bidding strategies must be the same. Because of the transfers from the
procurer to the losing suppliers, the procurers payo¤ must be lower in Benchmark II.
Implications of the rst observation (Myerson incentive compatibility)
We rst consider the implications of the rst observation. Fix any q(ci). We can view any equilibrium
strategy (q(ci); p(ci)) as an incentive compatible direct mechanism that leads to decreasing scores in type.
The quality bid function q(ci) can be viewed as an allocation rule, and the price function p(ci) can be viewed
as a payment rule. Then the Myerson approach allows us to pin down the payment rule p(ci) as a function
of the allocation rule q(). The following provides the details.
Given a (q(ci); p(ci)) pair that leads to scores that are decreasing in type, consider a type ci suppliers
problem of choosing a ~ci to maximize his expected payo¤ when the other supplier is truthful:
max
~ci
i(~ci; ci) = [1  F (~ci)][p(~ci)  (1  )ci&(q(~ci))]  ci&(q(~ci)): (2)
If (q(); p()) is a pure strategy equilibrium, then ~ci ; the solution to (2), satises ~ci = ci, 8ci. In other
words, the following incentive compatibility (IC) condition holds:
ci = arg max
~ci
i(~ci; ci) = [1  F (~ci)][p(~ci)  (1  )ci&(q(~ci))]  ci&(q(~ci)): (3)
7The identied equilibrium score, quality and price bids are all di¤erentiable in type.
8The equilibrium analysis in this section applies to an environment with a general number of suppliers,  2 [0; 1] and score
function s = q   p, ;  > 0.
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If q0(ci) < 0; the single crossing condition holds:
@2i(~ci; ci)
@~ci@ci
=  df[1  F (~ci)](1  )&(q(~ci)) + &(q(~ci))g
d~ci
= f(~ci)(1  )&(q(~ci))  [1  F (~ci)](1  )& 0(q(~ci))q0(~ci)  & 0(q(~ci))q0(~ci)
> 0;
which means such q(ci) can be supported by the pricing rule that will be identied below.
The IC condition (3), together with the envelope theorem, thus leads to
di(ci; ci)
dci
=  f[1  F (ci)](1  )&(q(ci)) + &(q(ci))g: (4)
Note that in equilibrium with scores monotonic in type, regardless of the value of , we must have
i(c; c) = 0. In equilibrium, the least e¢ cient type c never wins and never incurs a cost of quality.9
Using the envelope condition (4), we have
i(ci; ci) =
Z c
ci
f[1  F (t)](1  )&(q(t)) + &(q(t))gdt: (5)
By the denition of i(~ci; ci) in (2), we further have
i(ci; ci) = [1  F (ci)][p(ci)  (1  )ci&(q(ci))]  ci&(q(ci))
=
Z c
ci
f[1  F (t)](1  )&(q(t)) + &(q(t))gdt;
which leads to price rule
p(ci) =
R c
ci
f[1  F (t)](1  )&(q(t)) + &(q(t))gdt+ ci&(q(ci))
1  F (ci) + (1  )ci&(q(ci))  0: (6)
Implications of the second observation (optimal bids for a given score)
We now turn to the implication of the second observation. Suppose (q(ci); p(ci)) is a symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium. By implication of the rst observation, we must have that (6) holds. Dene
s(ci) = s(q(ci); p(ci)): (7)
The second observation says that any equilibrium (q(ci); p(ci)) must solve the following optimization
problem:
(q(ci); p(ci)) = arg max
(q;p)
f[1  F (ci)][p  (1  )ci&(q)]  ci&(q)g
s:t: : s = q   p = s(ci):
9Note q(c) = 0 for  = 1.
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The corresponding Lagrangian for the above problem is
max
(q;p;)
L(q; p; ) = [1  F (ci)][p  (1  )ci&(q)]  ci&(q) + [(q   p)  s(ci)]:
The rst order conditions are as follows:
L(q; p; )
@q
=  [1  F (ci)](1  )ci& 0(q)  ci& 0(q) +  = 0;
L(q; p; )
@p
= [1  F (ci)]   = 0;
L(q; p; )
@
= (q   p)  s(ci) = 0:
We thus have
& 0(q) =
1  F (ci)
cif[1  F (ci)](1  ) + g =
1
ci[(1  ) + 1 F (ci) ]
: (8)
We can thus pin down the candidate equilibrium quality
q(ci) = (&
0) 1(
1
cif(1  ) + 1 F (ci)g
): (9)
Note that the quality bid q(ci) is identied by only using the second observation. This is the case for the
di¤erence-form score function that we consider, but it is not the case in general. Please refer to Appendix
B for the procedure for identifying q(ci) without solving for the equilibrium score bidding function for a
general score function. In particular, the case of a ratio score function is studied there as an example.
Clearly, for an all-pay quality bid with  = 1, we have q(c) = (& 0) 1(0) = 0.10 For a winner-pay quality
bid with  = 0, we have q(c) = (& 0) 1( 1c ) > 0 since &
00() > 0. Clearly, we have q0() < 0, since
q0(ci) =
[ 1cif(1 )+ 1 F (ci)g
]0
& 00(q(ci))
< 0:
Since q(ci) is decreasing, the above characterized (q(); p()) would constitute a symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium within the class we consider if and only if the corresponding score function s(ci) = q(ci)  p(ci)
is decreasing in type. This is indeed the case as veried by the following lemma, whose proof is relegated to
appendix A.
Lemma 1 s0(ci) = q0(ci)  p0(ci) < 0.
We thus have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The symmetric bidding strategy (q(); p()) identied in (9) and (6) constitutes the unique sym-
metric pure strategy equilibrium with scores decreasing in types. Moreover, q() is decreasing in type.
10 In general, q(c) = 0 holds for any  2 (0; 1].
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The way we establish the equilibrium implies that the following two remarks are straightforward.
Remark 1 The equilibrium analysis of this section applies to  2 [0; 1].
Remark 2 Our equilibrium characterization requires & 0(0) = 0, which says marginal cost must be zero when
quality is zero. Che and Gale [8] also require the same condition in their equilibrium analysis in a complete
information score auction setting. If & 0(0) > 0, the equilibrium involves pooling. For example, consider  = 1.
Dene the cuto¤ c^ by & 0(0) = 1 F (c^)c^ . In equilibrium, all types in [c^; c] place the same bid as type c.
11
We have the following two additional remarks on applying our procedure to a more general environment.
Remark 3 The above two-step procedure for identifying the symmetric pure strategy equilibrium if it exists
can be generalized to an environment with an arbitrary number of suppliers and a general class of score
functions s(q; p). The details are included in Appendix B. In an application there with score function s =
s(q; p) = qp and N  2 suppliers,12 we show that if & 0(0) = 0, then a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium
generating scores decreasing in type does not exist for the case of all-pay quality bids. However, if & 0(0) > 0,
then the equilibrium for the case of all-pay quality bids is identied as
q(ci) = (&
0) 1(
c& 0(0)
ci
);
p(ci) =
R c
ci
&(q(t))dt+ ci&(q(ci))
[1  F (ci)]N 1 :
Remark 4 Following the insights of Hanazono, Nakabayashi and Tsuruoka [9], there is an alternative ap-
proach, which instead requires identifying an equilibrium score function as an intermediate step before de-
composing it into quality and price bids. The details are as fellows.13
Assume a general score rule of s(q; p) and N  2 suppliers. From the second observation, if s(ci) is the
equilibrium score, we can solve for
(q(cijs(ci)); p(cijs(ci))) = arg max
(q;p)
[1  F (ci)]N 1[p  (1  )ci&(q)]  ci&(q);
s:t: : s(q; p) = s(ci):
Then consider supplier is optimization problem
max
~ci
i(~ci; ci) = [1  F (~ci)]N 1[p(~cijs(~ci))  (1  )ci&(q(~cijs(~ci)))]  ci&(q(~cijs(~ci))):
11This is implied by (9).
12The equilibrium analysis in the application applies to a score function of s = s(q; p) = q

p
with , > 0.
13Our approach avoids this additional intermediate step of solving for the score bidding function, which could involve sub-
stantial calculations.
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If s(ci) is an equilibrium, then we must have ~ci = ci. This gives the following rst order condition
 (N   1)[1  F (ci)]N 2f(~ci)][p(~cijs(~ci))  (1  )ci&(q(~cijs(~ci)))]
+[1  F (ci)]N 1[pci(~cijs(~ci)) + ps(~cijs(~ci))s0(~ci)
  (1  )ci& 0(q(~cijs(~ci)))(qci(~cijs(~ci)) + qs(~cijs(~ci))s0(~ci))]
 ci& 0(q(~cijs(~ci)))(qci(~cijs(~ci)) + qs(~cijs(~ci))s0(~ci))
= 0; when ~ci = ci.
Under the proper conditions, this equation would pin down a solution of s(ci) with applicable boundary condi-
tion. If s(ci) is decreasing in type, then the equilibrium is identied as (q(); p()) = (q(cijs(ci)); p(cijs(ci))).
The procedure proposed in this paper has the merit of saving the middle step of solving for the equilibrium
score by rst directly solving for the quality bid directly.
4 Equilibrium when quality bids are placed before price bids
In this section, we focus on the case of all-pay quality bids, i.e.  = 1. Suppose now that the suppliers
must rst decide simultaneously which qualities to provide. The quality bids will then be observed by both
suppliers before they simultaneously make the second stage price bids. We solve the game by backward
induction.
We start from the second stage. Suppose the rst round quality bids are qi; i = 1; 2. Clearly, the second
stage is a simultaneous move price setting subgame between the two suppliers. We use q(1) and q(2) to denote
the higher and lower quality bids from the rst stage. The supplier with higher quality q(1) would bid at a
level p such that q(1)   p = q(2), and the supplier with lower quality q(2) would bid at a zero price.14 The
supplier with higher quality wins the procurement and earns a second stage surplus of p = q(1)   q(2).
We now derive the rst stage quality bids. Assume a decreasing symmetric bidding strategy q(). We
apply the truthful direct mechanism approach. Assuming that the other supplier follows strategy q(), the
expected payo¤ of supplier i of type ci is as follows if he reports c0i:
~i(c
0
i; ci) =
Z c
c0i
(q(c0i)  q())f()d   ci&(q(c0i)):
The incentive compatibility condition requires @~i(c
0
i;ci)
@c0i
jc0i=ci = 0, which yields
q0(c0i)[(1  F (c0i))  ci& 0(q(c0i))]jc0i=ci = q0(ci)[(1  F (ci))  ci& 0(q(ci))] = 0:
14We assume that when the procurer is indi¤erent between the two suppliersscores, he allocates the contract to the supplier
with higher quality. In the event of identical quality, any tie breaking rule works.
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This reduces to
& 0(q(ci)) =
1  F (ci)
ci
;
which coincides with (8) for  = 1. Therefore, as was established in Section 3, q(ci) is decreasing in type.
We thus have that the observability of quality bids when suppliers make their price bids does not change
their quality choices.
Moreover, the total surplus, the procurers expected payo¤ and each suppliers expected payo¤ are not
a¤ected. It is clear that the total surplus is not a¤ected as this is completely determined by the suppliers
quality choices, since the total surplus is simply the di¤erence between the higher quality and total costs
incurred.
The rst stage IC condition, together with the envelope theorem, leads to
d~i(ci; ci)
dci
=  &(q(ci)): (10)
Note we still have ~i(c; c) = 0 as the least e¢ cient type never wins and always incurs zero cost. We thus
have
i(ci; ci) =
Z c
ci
&(q(t))dt; (11)
which coincides with (5), which gives the suppliersexpected payo¤ conditional on type ci for the case of
simultaneous quality and price bids. Since total surplus and the suppliers expected payo¤ conditional on
type ci are the same across the two scenarios, the procurers expected payo¤ must also be the same. We
summarize these results in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Quality bids, supplier expected payo¤ conditional on type ci and procurer expected payo¤ (and
thus expected total surplus) do not depend on whether quality bids are placed simultaneously with or before
the price bids.
5 All-pay versus winner-pay quality bids
We now turn to the comparison between a procurement auction with all-pay quality bids and two benchmark
environments of winner-pay quality bids. In the rst benchmark scenario of winner-pay quality bids, we
assume a hypothetical environment, in which the losing suppliers do not need to incur costs to place their
quality bids. In the second benchmark scenario of winner-pay quality bids, we have both suppliers incur
their costs of placing their quality bids but the losing suppliers cost of placing his quality bid is reimbursed
by the procurer.
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5.1 Comparison to the rst benchmark: loser incurs no quality cost ( = 0)
We rst compare a procurement auction with all-pay quality bids with the rst benchmark of winner-pay
quality bids, in which hypothetically the losing suppliers do not need to incur costs to place their quality bids.
We will establish that all-pay quality bids lead to lower quality provision in general, and for the class of cost
functions &(q) = q ;  > 1, lower total surplus and supplierspayo¤s. Moreover, we will identify conditions
under which the procurer derives higher and lower payo¤s from all-pay quality bids than winner-pay quality
bids. In particular, we will show that when &(q) = q ; as  converges to 1 from above, i.e. when the cost
function &(q) gets close to being linear, winner-pay bids ( = 0) cannot be procurer payo¤ maximizing if the
proportion  can be arbitrarily chosen in [0; 1]:
First, by (9), the equilibrium quality bid decreases in , which means that all-pay quality bids lead to
lower quality provision.
Proposition 1 All-pay quality bids lead to lower quality provision than winner-pay quality bids.
From (4), we have
di(ci; ci)
dci
=  f[1  F (ci)](1  ) + g&(q(ci; ));
where from (9)
q(ci; ) = (&
0) 1(
1  F (ci)
cif(1  )[1  F (ci)] + g ):
Therefore, we have
di(ci; ci)
dci
=  [1  F (ci)]f [1  F (ci)](1  ) + 
1  F (ci) g(&  (&
0) 1)(
1  F (ci)
cif(1  )[1  F (ci)] + g ):
Since i(c; c) = 0 in both scenarios, if we can show that jdi(ci;ci)dci j decreases with , then all-pay quality
bids lead to lower supplier payo¤s than winner-pay quality bids. This is the case when ' = &  [(& 0) 1] is
convex as will be veried in the proof of the following proposition. Clearly, &(q) = q ;  > 1 satises this
condition.
Proposition 2 If ' = &  (& 0) 1 is convex, then all-pay quality bids lead to lower supplier payo¤s than
winner-pay quality bids.
We next turn to the total surplus and the procurers payo¤. Total surplus is
TS() =
Z c
c
q(c; )d[1  (1  F (c))2]
 2  Ecif(1  )ci&(q(ci; ))[1  F (ci)]g   2  Ecici&(q(ci; )):
The procurers payo¤ equals the di¤erence between total surplus and the supplierspayo¤s. A suppliers
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expected payo¤ is
S() =
Z c
c
i(ci; ci)dF (ci)
=
Z c
c
Z c
ci
f[1  F (t)](1  ) + g&(q(t; ))dtdF (ci):
Therefore, the procurers payo¤ equals15
P () = TS()  2S().
In the following analysis, we consider &(q) = q ;  > 1. With this specication, we have the following
results.
Lemma 2 Assume &(q) = q ;  > 1. We have
TS() = 2(1  1

)Ec
(
[
1
c[(1  ) + 1 F (c) ]
]
1
 1 (1  F (c))
)
;
S() = Ec
(
1
c
[
1
c[(1  ) + 1 F (c) ]
]
1
 1
F (c)
f(c)
[1  F (c)]
)
;
P () = 2Ec
(
[
1
c[(1  ) + 1 F (c) ]
]
1
 1 (1  F (c))[(1  1

)  1
c
F (c)
f(c)
]
)
:
Lemma 2 immediately leads to the following results.16
Proposition 3 If & = q ;  > 1, all-pay quality bids lead to lower total surplus and supplierspayo¤s than
winner-pay bids; and they lead to lower procurer payo¤ when (1  1 )  1c F (c)f(c)  0;8c 2 [c; c].
For example, we consider the class F (c) = (c   1) on [1; 2],  > 0. For this class of type distributions,
we have
15This can be veried as below:
P () =
Z c
c
(q(c)  p(c))2(1  F (c))dF (c) = 2
Z c
c
[q(c)(1  F (c))  p(c)(1  F (c))]dF (c)
= 2
Z c
c
fq(c)(1  F (c)) 
Z c
c
f[(1  F (t))(1  ) + ]&(q(t))gdt  &(q(c))c[+ (1  )(1  F (c))]gdF (c)
= 2
Z c
c
fq(c)(1  F (c))  &(q(c))c[+ (1  )(1  F (c))]gdF (c)| {z }
TS()
 2
Z c
c
Z c
c
f[(1  F (t))(1  ) + ]&(q(t))gdtdF (c)| {z }
S()
:
16The result on supplierspayo¤s in Proposition 3 is consistent with that of Proposition 2.
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(1  1

)  1
c
F (c)
f(c)
= (1  1

)  1

c  1
c
:
Since c 1c < 1; the right hand side of the above equation is always positive when
(1  1

)  1

> 0, i.e. 1 +
1

< :
We thus have the following corollary.17
Corollary 1 If &(q) = q ;  > 1, and F (c) = (c  1) on [1; 2] with 1 + 1 < , then all-pay quality bids lead
to lower procurer payo¤s than winner-pay quality bids.
The next proposition reveals a su¢ cient condition on the cost of quality function that guarantees that
winner-pay bids do not maximize the procurers payo¤.
Proposition 4 If & = q ;  > 1, then 0P (0) approaches positive innity when  approaches 1 from above.
Proposition 4 reveals that if the proportion  can be chosen from [0; 1] without restriction, then in general
winner-pay quality bids do not maximize procurers payo¤ if  is su¢ ciently close to 1.
We next answer the question whether it is possible that all-pay quality bids lead to a higher procurer
payo¤ than winner-pay quality bids, which would justify the adoption of score procurements with all-pay
quality bids. The following analysis illustrates that this is in general possible.
All-pay quality bids can either benet or hurt the procurer
Although Proposition 4 reveals a weak condition under which winner-pay quality bids do not maximize the
procurers payo¤ when the proportion  can be arbitrarily chosen from [0; 1], it turns out that it is di¢ cult
to identify general su¢ cient conditions under which all-pay quality bids benet the procurer compared to
winner-pay quality bids. We next provide examples to illustrate that all-pay quality bids may indeed benet
the procurer.
Let &(q) = q ;  > 1, f(c) = 4   2c and F (c) = 2(2c   c22   32 ) on [1; 2]: We have F (c)cf(c) =
2c  c22   32
c(2 c) and
17Note that c[(1  ) + 
1 F (c) ] increases with  for any c.
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1  F (c) = (2  c)2. Note that18
P ( = 0) = 2Ecf[ 1
c
]
1
 1 (1  F (c))[(1  1

)  1

F (c)
cf(c)
]g; and
P ( = 1) = 2Ecf[ 1  F (c)
c
]
1
 1 (1  F (c))[(1  1

)  1
c
F (c)
f(c)
]g:
Numerical simulation reveals that all-pay quality bids lead to higher procurer payo¤ than winner-pay
quality bids, i.e. p( = 1) > p( = 0), if and only if  2 (1; 1:18613), i.e. when the e¤ort cost function
is not far from a linear function. In particular, when  = 1:1, we have P ( = 0) = 8: 28  10 4 and
P ( = 1) = 1: 52 10 3.
All-pay quality bids lead to lower quality bids than winner-pay quality bids, which allows suppliers to
lower their price bids. It is thus possible that the drop in price bids dominates the drop in quality bids,
which makes it possible that all-pay quality bids lead to higher procurer payo¤.
5.2 Comparison to the second benchmark: losers sunk quality cost reimbursed
by the procurer
We next compare a procurement auction with all-pay quality bids with the second benchmark of winner-pay
quality bids, in which both suppliers incur their costs of placing their quality bids but the losing suppliers
cost of placing his quality bid is reimbursed by the procurer.
Note that suppliers payo¤ functions are identical in the rst and second benchmark environments.
Therefore, we must have the following result.
Lemma 3 The equilibrium bidding strategy is the same across the two benchmark environments.
Based on Lemma 3 and the results of Section 5:1, we immediately have the following result.
18Let a = 1
1  . One can verify that
p( = 0) = 2
a
Z 2
1
(1  1

)ca(2  c)2   1

ca(2  c)(2  c
2
  3
2c
) dc
=  (1  1
a
)a 1f 2
a+5   4
a(a+ 1)(a+ 2)(a+ 3)
  4
a(a+ 1)(a+ 2)
  2
a+13  1
a(a+ 1)
+
2a+4   4
(a+ 1)(a+ 2)
  2
a+3   1
(a+ 2)(a+ 3)
+
3
a
  4
a+ 1
+
1
a+ 2
g; and
p( = 1) = 2
a
Z 2
1
(1  1

)ca(2  c)2 2a   1

ca(2  c)1 2a(2  c
2
  3
2c
) dc
=  2(1  1
a
)a 1f2
3 a
a
 1
2
(3  2a; 1 + a) + 23 a 1
2
(2  2a; 1 + a)
  22 a 1
2
(2  2a; 2 + a)  3
2a
 1
2
(2  2a; a)g;
where z(d; e) =
R z
0 x
d 1(1  x)e 1 dx is the beta function.
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Proposition 5 Compared to the second benchmark with winner-pay quality bids, (i) all-pay quality bids lead
to lower quality provision; (ii) if ' = &  (& 0) 1 is convex (e.g. when &(q) = q ;  > 1), then all-pay quality
bids lead to lower supplier payo¤s.
Note that equilibrium bidding strategies are the same across the two benchmark environments as shown
by Lemma 3, and in the second benchmark, the loser also incurs a quality provision cost that the procurer
covers. We thus have the following results.
Corollary 2 The suppliers payo¤s must be same across the two benchmark environments, and the total
surplus and procurers payo¤ must be lower in the second benchmark environment.
This means that a procurement auction with all-pay quality bids is more likely to render a higher procurer
payo¤ when the second benchmark of winner-pay quality bids is adopted instead of the rst benchmark.
In particular, in the examples provided in the end of Section 5:1, all-pay quality bids generate higher
procurer payo¤s than winner-pay quality bids under the second benchmark, whenever they do under the
rst benchmark.
It remains to further investigate whether the second winner-pay benchmark can generate a higher procurer
payo¤ than all-pay quality bids, and how the total surplus compares. We investigate these issues under the
assumption that &(q) = q ;  > 1. Note that under this specication, we have that q(c;  = 0) = (c) 
1
 1
by (9) and thus &(q(c;  = 0)) = (c) 

 1 .
We rst look at total surplus. In a procurement auction with all-pay quality bids, i.e.  = 1, by Lemma
2, the total surplus is
TS(1) = 2(1  1

)Ecf[ 1  F (c)
c
]
1
 1 (1  F (c))g
= 2(   1)   1Ec[c  1 1 (1  F (c))

 1 ]:
Let c(1) denote the higher cost parameter of the suppliers. In the second benchmark of winner-pay quality
bids, in which both suppliers incur their costs of placing their quality bids but the losing suppliers cost of
placing his quality bid is reimbursed by the procurer, the total surplus is
TSR(1) = TS(0)  Ec(1) [c(1)&(q(c(1);  = 0))]
= 2(1  1

)Ecf[ 1
c
]
1
 1 (1  F (c))g   2Ec[c&(q(c;  = 0))F (c)]
= 2(1  1

)Ecf[ 1
c
]
1
 1 (1  F (c))g   2Ec[ 

 1 c 
1
 1F (c)]
= 2(   1)   1Ec[c  1 1 (1  F (c))]  2Ec[ 

 1 c 
1
 1F (c)]:
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We thus have
TSR(1)  TS(1)
2 

 1 (   1)
= Ecfc  1 1 [(1  F (c))  (1  F (c))

 1   1
   1F (c)]g:
Let x = F (c) 2 [0; 1]. Note [(1  x)  (1  x)  1   1 1x]0 =  1 [(1  x)
1
 1   1]  0 and (1  x)  (1 
x)

 1   1 1x = 0 when x = 0. Therefore, (1  F (c))  (1  F (c))

 1   1 1F (c)  0;8c. We thus have
TSR(1)  TS(1)  0:
Recall that Proposition 5 says that all-pay quality bids lead to lower supplierspayo¤s than the second
benchmark scenario if &(q) = q ;  > 1. This implies that the procurer must enjoy a higher payo¤ with
all-pay quality bids than with winner-pay bids under the second benchmark.
We summarize the above results as follows.
Proposition 6 Suppose & = q ;  > 1. Relative to the second benchmark environment where the losing
suppliers cost of placing his quality bid is reimbursed by the procurer, all-pay quality bids generate higher
total surplus and higher procurer payo¤s.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we study the impact of an all-pay quality component in score procurements. Our focus is on the
equilibrium quality, supplier payo¤, procurer payo¤ and total surplus. We nd that compared to benchmark
environments with winner-pay quality bids, all-pay quality bids tend to lower the quality provision. However,
all-pay quality bids may improve the procurers payo¤. This nding thus provides an additional justication
for a procurers requirement that suppliers actually incur the cost of developing the product as part of their
bid. Doing so not only guarantees that the procurer acquires exactly the quality that the winning supplier
bids, but also may increase the procurers payo¤.
Surprisingly, our study shows that when all-pay quality bids are placed and disclosed before price bids,
the same quality bids, supplierspayo¤s and procurers payo¤ are generated as in the case of simultaneous
quality and price bids. One implication of this nding is that when price bids are simultaneously placed after
simultaneous all-pay quality bids, a policy of revelation of the quality bid information before suppliers make
their price bids does not alter equilibrium quality and expected payo¤s of the procurer and suppliers.19
One methodological innovation in this paper lies in that we come up with a two-step procedure, which
allows us to identify the quality and price bids directly if there exists a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium
that renders scores decreasing in types. This procedure does not rely on solving for the equilibrium score
function as a middle step. Our procedure also reveals if such an equilibrium does not exist.
19Despite identical expected transfers from the procurer to the suppliers under the two informational regimes (due to payo¤
equivalence), the distribution of the transfer conditional on the type prole di¤ers.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
Note that from (6), we have
(1  F (ci))p(ci) =
Z c
ci
f[1  F (t)](1  )&(q(t)) + &(q(t))gdt+ ci&(q(ci)) + (1  F (ci))(1  )ci&(q(ci)):
Note that from (8), we have ci[+(1 )(1 F (ci))]1 F (ci) &
0(q(ci)) = 1. We thus have
[(1  F (ci))p(ci)]0 = ci& 0(q(ci))q0(ci) + ci df[1  F (ci)](1  )&(q(ci))g
dci
, (1  F (ci))p0(ci)  f(ci)p(ci) = ci& 0(q(ci))q0(ci) + ci df[1  F (ci)](1  )&(q(ci))g
dci
, p0(ci)  f(ci)
1  F (ci)p(ci) = q
0(ci)
ci[+ (1  )(1  F (ci))]
1  F (ci) &
0(q(ci))  f(ci)
1  F (ci)ci(1  )&(q(ci))
, p0(ci) = q0(ci)  f(ci)
1  F (ci)ci(1  )&(q(ci)) +
f(ci)
1  F (ci)p(ci)
, s0(ci) = q0(ci)  p0(ci) = f(ci)
1  F (ci)fci(1  )&(q(ci))  p(ci)g:
Note that from (6), we have ci(1  )&(q(ci))  p(ci) < 0. We thus have s0(ci) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
Recall
di(ci; ci)
dci
=  [1  F (ci)]f [1  F (ci)](1  ) + 
1  F (ci) g(&  (&
0) 1)(
1  F (ci)
cif(1  )[1  F (ci)] + g ):
Since i(c; c) = 0 in both scenarios, if we can show that jdi(ci;ci)dci j decreases with , then we have that
all-pay quality bids lead to lower supplier payo¤ than winner-pay quality bids.
Let x() = 1 F (ci)cif(1 )[1 F (ci)]+g . We have x() > 0; x
0() < 0: Thus the monotonicity of jdi(ci;ci)dci j with
respect to  is equivalent to the monotonicity of 1x'(x); x  0. Note '(0) = 0 and limx!0 1x'(x) = '0(0)  0,
since ' increases. In addition, [ 1x'(x)]
0 = 1x2 [x'
0(x) '(x)]. x'0(x) '(x) increases with x since its derivative
is x'00(x)  0 and reaches zero when x = 0. We thus have [ 1x'(x)]0  0, i.e. jdi(ci;ci)dci j decreases with .
Proof of Lemma 2
By (9), we have
q(ci; ) = [
1
ci[(1  ) + 1 F (ci) ]
]
1
 1 :
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The expected total surplus is thus
TS() =
Z c
c
q( ; )d[1  (1  F ())2]  2  Ecif(1  )ci&(q(ci; ))[1  F (ci)]g   2  Eci [ci&(q(ci; ))]
= 2Ef[ 1
 [(1  ) + 1 F () ]
]
1
 1 (1  F ())g   2  Ef(1  ) [ 1
 [(1  ) + 1 F () ]
]

 1 [1  F ()]g
 2  Ef [ 1
 [(1  ) + 1 F () ]
]

 1 g
= 2Ef[ 1
 [(1  ) + 1 F () ]
]
1
 1 (1  F ())g
 2  Ef[ 1
 [(1  ) + 1 F () ]
]

 1  [(1  )  
1  F () ][1  F ()]g
= 2Ef[ 1
 [(1  ) + 1 F () ]
]
1
 1 (1  F ())g   2  Ef[ 1
 [(1  ) + 1 F () ]
]
1
 1 [1  F ()] 1

g
= 2(1  1

)Ef[ 1
 [(1  ) + 1 F () ]
]
1
 1 (1  F ())g.
Suppliersexpected surplus is
2S()
= 2
Z c
c
Z c
c
f[1  F ()](1  ) + g&(q( ; ))ddF (c)
= 2
Z c
c
Z 
0
f[1  F ()](1  ) + g&(q())dF (c)d
= 2
Z c
c
f[1  F ()](1  ) + g&(q())F ()d
= 2Ef[(1  ) + 
1  F () ][
1
 [(1  ) + 1 F () ]
]

 1
F ()
f()
[1  F ()]g
= 2Ef[(1  ) + 
1  F () ][
1
 [(1  ) + 1 F () ]
]
[ 1
 [(1  ) + 1 F () ]
]
1
 1
F ()
f()
[1  F ()]g
= 2Ef[ 1

][
1
 [(1  ) + 1 F () ]
]
1
 1
F ()
f()
[1  F ()]g:
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Therefore, we have the following procurers expected payo¤
P () = TS()  2S()
= 2(1  1

)E [
1
 [(1  ) + 1 F () ]
]
1
 1 (1  F ())
 2E [ 1

][
1
 [(1  ) + 1 F () ]
]
1
 1
F ()
f()
[1  F ()]
= 2E [
1
 [(1  ) + 1 F () ]
]
1
 1 (1  F ())[(1  1

)  1

F ()
f()
]:
Proof of Proposition 4
We have
0P () = 2Ef( 
1
   1)[ [(1  ) +

1  F () ]
 F ()[(1  1

)  1

F ()
f()
]g:
Thus
0P (0) = 2Ef( 
1
   1)[ ]
 F ()[(1  1

)  1

F ()
f()
]g:
Therefore
lim
!1+
0P (0)(   1) = 2
Z
[
F ()

]2d > 0:
We thus have
lim
!1+
0P (0) = +1:
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Appendix B
In this section, we describe how to generalize our two-step procedure for identifying symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium in an environment with N  2 suppliers and a general score function s(q; p) with sq(q; p) > 0,
sp(q; p) < 0.
Implication of the rst observation
We treat equilibrium (q(ci); p(ci)) as an incentive compatible general direct mechanism that generates scores
decreasing in types, then the Myerson [11] approach allows us to write down payment rule p(ci) as a function
of the allocation rule q(ci). The following is the details.
Given (q(ci); p(ci)) that leads to scores that are decreasing in types, consider a type ci supplier is problem
of making an announcement ~ci to maximize his expected payo¤ when the other supplier is truthful:
max
~ci
i(~ci; ci) = [1  F (~ci)]N 1[p(~ci)  (1  )ci&(q(~ci))]  ci&(q(~ci)):
If (q(); p()) is a pure strategy equilibrium, we would have ~ci = ci, i.e. the incentive compatibility (IC)
condition:
ci = arg max
~ci
i(~ci; ci) = [1  F (~ci)]N 1[p(~ci)  (1  )ci&(q(~ci))]  ci&(q(~ci)): (12)
The IC condition (12), together with the envelope theorem, thus leads to
di(ci; ci)
dci
=  f[1  F (ci)]N 1(1  )&(q(ci)) + &(q(ci))g: (13)
Note that at equilibrium with scores monotonic in types, we must have i(c; c) = 0 for both  = 0 and
 = 1. For both cases, the least e¢ cient type c never wins and never incurs cost to produce. Note we must
have q(c) = 0 for  = 1.
Using the envelope condition of (13), we have
i(ci; ci) =
Z c
ci
f[1  F (t)]N 1(1  )&(q(t)) + &(q(t))gdt: (14)
By the denition of i(~ci; ci), we have
i(ci; ci) = [1  F (ci)]N 1[p(ci)  (1  )ci&(q(ci))]  ci&(q(ci))
=
Z c
ci
f[1  F (ci)]N 1(1  )&(q(ci)) + &(q(ci))gdt;
which leads to price rule of
p(ci) =
R c
ci
f[1  F (t)]N 1(1  )&(q(t)) + &(q(t))gdt+ ci&(q(ci))
[1  F (ci)]N 1 + (1  )ci&(q(ci)) > 0: (15)
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Implication of the second observation
Suppose (q(ci); p(ci)) is a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. By the implications of the rst observation,
we must have q0(ci) < 0 (monotone allocation rule is implied by incentive compatibility condition) and (15)
holds. Dene
s(ci) = s(q(ci); p(ci)): (16)
We now look at the implications of the second observation, which says that equilibrium (q(ci); p(ci)) must
solve the following optimization problem:
(q(ci); p(ci)) = arg max
(q;p)
[1  F (ci)]N 1[p  (1  )ci&(q)]  ci&(q);
s:t: : s(q; p) = s(ci):
The corresponding Lagrangian is
max
(q;p;)
L(q; p; ) = [1  F (ci)]N 1[p  (1  )ci&(q)]  ci&(q) + [s(q; p)  s(ci)]:
The rst order conditions are as follows:
L(q; p; )
@q
=  [1  F (ci)]N 1(1  )ci& 0(q)  ci& 0(q) + sq(q; p) = 0;
L(q; p; )
@p
= [1  F (ci)]N 1 + sp(q; p) = 0;
L(q; p; )
@
= s(q; p)  s(ci) = 0:
We thus have
& 0(q(ci)) =  sq(q(ci); p(ci))
sp(q(ci); p(ci))
1
cif(1  ) + [1 F (ci)]N 1 g
; (17)
where p(ci) is given by (15).
Together with boundary condition q(c) = 0, we can pin down the candidate quality bid q(ci). If there is
no solution exists, then there is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
Suppose q(ci) is a solution of (17) with boundary condition q(c) = 0, and p(ci) is the corresponding
price bid given by (15). If the corresponding score bid s(ci) = s(q(ci); p(ci)) is decreasing in types, then we
have (q(ci); p(ci)) constitutes a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. Otherwise, there is no symmetric pure
strategy equilibrium.
An application to the ratio score
As an application, we next show that with the ratio form score function s = s(q; p) = qp , there might be
no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium for the case of an all-pay quality bid, i.e.  = 1. The equilibrium
analysis in this application applies to a score function of s = s(q; p) = q

p with , > 0.
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In this case, (17) is written as
& 0(q) =
p
q
[1  F (ci)]N 1
ci
: (18)
Given (15), we have
& 0(q(ci)) =
1
q(ci)
R c
ci
&(q(t))dt+ ci&(q(ci))
ci
;
i.e., ciq(ci)& 0(q(ci)) =
Z c
ci
&(q(t))dt+ ci&(q(ci)):
Taking derivative wrt. ci both sides, we have
q(ci)&
0(q(ci)) + ciq(ci)& 00(q(ci))q0(ci) = 0:
We thus have
q0(ci) =   &
0(q(ci))
ci& 00(q(ci))
< 0; (19)
with boundary condition q(c) = 0.
Assume &(q) = q ;  > 1. We have
(   1) q
0(ci)
q(ci)
=   1
ci
< 0;
i.e.
d ln q(ci)
dci
=
d[  ln ci]
dci
;
with boundary condition q(c) = 0.
We thus have
ln q(ci) =   1
   1 ln ci +A;
which gives
q(ci) = (
1
ci
)
1
 1 exp(A):
Note we cannot have q(c) = 0 if c is nite. Therefore, there exists no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium
for this case.
However, if & 0(0) > 0, then we indeed have a solution for (19) with boundary condition q(c) = 0, which
can be identied as below.
(19) can be rewritten as
d& 0(q(ci))
dci
=
d[  ln ci]
dci
;
which entails
& 0(q(ci)) = (
1
ci
) exp(A):
Using the boundary condition of q(c) = 0, we have
exp(A) = c& 0(0);
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which leads to
q(ci) = (&
0) 1(
c& 0(0)
ci
):
To conrm such identied (q(ci); p(ci)) is indeed an equilibrium, we now only need to verify that s(ci) =
s(q(ci); p(ci)) =
q(ci)
p(ci)
is decreasing in types. Using (18) and (15) for  = 1, we have
[ln s(ci)]
0 =
q0(ci)
q(ci)
  p
0(ci)
p(ci)
=
1
q(ci)
[q0(ci)  q(ci)
p(ci)
p0(ci)]
=
1
q(ci)
[q0(ci)  ( ci&
0(q(ci))
[1  F (ci)]N 1 )
 1(
ci&
0(q(ci))q0(ci)
[1  F (ci)]N 1 + (N   1)p(ci)f(ci))]
=   1
q(ci)
(
ci&
0(q(ci))
[1  F (ci)]N 1 )
 1(N   1)p(ci)f(ci)
< 0;
which means s0(ci) < 0.
An interesting observation is that with the ratio score, regardless of the number of players, all type
distributions with the same support [c; c] yield the same equilibrium quality bidding strategies q(ci), ci 2 [c; c].
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